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Slovakia held parliamentary elections on 5 March. The ruling Smer-SD party, led by PM Robert
Fico, won the largest share of support, but failed to secure a majority. Daniel Kral assesses the
results, writing that the election has pushed Slovakia into uncharted waters, as a record eight
parties managed to secure representation in parliament, leaving a fractured party system that will
make stable governments diﬃcult to form.
The Slovak general election on 5 March resulted in a major political earthquake. With a turnout of
almost 60 per cent – consistent with the few previous parliamentary elections that have taken place
in the country – a record eight parties secured seats in the 150-strong parliament. Notably, a third of the vote was
captured by new parties or parties previously outside parliament, including 8 per cent for the extreme far-right party
ĽSNS, and 6.5 per cent for the three month old anti-establishment Sme Rodina (We Are a Family) party led by an
extravagant businessman. For the ﬁrst time in modern history, Slovakia faces the realistic prospect of political
deadlock.
Table: Results of the 2016 Slovak parliamentary election
Note: For more information on the parties see: Smer-SD; Freedom and Solidarity (SaS);
Ordinary People (OL’aNO); Slovak National Party (SNS); Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia
(L’SNS); We are a Family (Sme Rodina); Most–Híd; Network (#Siet‘); Christian Democratic
Movement (KDH); Party of the Hungarian Community (SMK).
The incumbent Smer-SD, led by PM Robert Fico, won a bitter victory, losing 40 per cent of its MPs relative to 2012
and its majority in parliament. Smer’s poor showing, despite large welfare-handouts in the months before March,
owes to three main factors. First, lacking a formal election programme two weeks before the election, Smer built the
campaign uniquely on protecting Slovakia in the context of the migration crisis. However, since all parties spoke with
one voice on the issue, Smer failed to diﬀerentiate itself from the competition and show its strength on other issues.
Second, Fico’s use of xenophobic rhetoric, such as promising to monitor all Muslims or to prevent the creation of a
compact Muslim community in Slovakia, backﬁred. Trying to outcompete extremists on extremism, Fico wasn’t able
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to channel the anxiety he fuelled. Finally, a perfect storm struck Smer shortly before the election, with a general
strike of teachers and mass walkouts of nurses demanding higher wages and pointing to the appalling state of
Slovakia’s public services. Fico’s refusal to negotiate and his insistence that they have no reason to complain ran
contrary to the everyday experiences of voters.
The economically libertarian Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) beat all expectations with its second place, largely owing
to its sweeping victory in Bratislava – a traditional bastion of the centre-right. Judged as having the best economic
programme by free-market think tanks, boasting experts on welfare, tax, healthcare or education reform, and with its
leader, MEP Richard Sulík, voicing coherent views in ﬂuent German in debates on German TV, the party
successfully leveraged its expertise. Moreover, both SaS and the socially conservative but otherwise incoherent
Ordinary People (OĽaNO), which came third, beneﬁted from a clear rejection of any cooperation with Smer months
before the vote.
Indeed, such outright rejection probably harmed the ﬂavourless Christian Democrats (KDH) who for the ﬁrst time
since 1990 narrowly missed the 5 per cent threshold, losing voters to the much more energetic and vocal OĽaNO,
and the #Sieť (Network) party of Radoslav Procházka, who had grand ambitions to lead a centre-right government,
but barely entered parliament. Most-Híd, the centre-right leaning party representing the Hungarian minority shed two
MPs relative to 2012, as it remained ambivalent about Smer and split the Hungarian vote with its competitor, SMK,
which attracted 4 per cent.
Following four years in the political wilderness, the nationalist SNS ended in fourth place. No longer perceived as
extremist, it probably has the best coalition potential. Indeed, SNS appears moderate compared to the biggest shock
of the election, the breakthrough of the far-right ĽSNS, whose members glorify the war-time Slovak puppet Nazi
state and, in some cases, deny the Holocaust. However, an exit poll revealed that its voters were overwhelmingly
concerned with corruption and social issues. It is not widespread radicalisation, but desperation with mainstream
parties which drove 8 per cent of the voters to embrace the extremists. Perhaps most worryingly, ĽSNS emerged as
the most popular party among ﬁrst time voters, just as its Hungarian counterpart, Jobbik, has been found most
popular among Hungarian university students.
The success of the anti-establishment Sme Rodina party, which boasts conspiracy-espousing ﬁgures and
organisers of the large but ineﬀective protests in the wake of the Gorilla scandal, further underscores the
disenchantment of voters with established parties.
Possible scenarios
All parties that made it to parliament as well as the president, Andrej Kiska, who plays a largely ceremonial role in
government formation, excluded any discussions with the far-right ĽSNS. Further complicating government
formation is the reluctance of all centre-right parties, not just SaS and OĽaNO, to prop up a Smer-dominated
government. Indeed, Smer needs the support of at least three of the smaller parties to secure a majority, which
would be ideologically heterogeneous, conﬂictual, and most likely unstable. There is little appetite among all
concerned to experiment with this alternative.
In a gesture of statesmanship, the unlikely new leader of the centre-right, Richard Sulík, vowed to lead a broad
coalition that would exclude Smer, the extremist ĽSNS, and the anti-establishment Sme Rodina. There are obvious
problems with this option. Relying on the slimmest majority possible, with 76 out of 150 MPs, serving a full term
would likely be a Herculean task even in democracies where allegations of buying MPs to vote a certain way are not
fresh in recent memory. Indeed, the previous attempt at a broad centre-right coalition after the 2010 general election
lasted only 18 months. And to rely on tacit support of the unpredictable Sme Rodina would be a highly risky tactic.
The greatest hurdle for Sulík in the immediate term is to achieve a reconciliation of the nationalists with the
Hungarians. While SNS hinted that it is willing to cooperate, Most-Híd faces a fundamental dilemma. Forming a
government with the nationalist SNS may alienate its core Hungarian constituency, while being the stumbling block
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Bratislava. From pixabay / public domain.
to a possible centre-right coalition may weaken its
appeal among centre-right voters. In quickly
excluding a coalition with Smer, Most-Híd made
addressing this dilemma unavoidable.
It is possible that both Fico and Sulík will fail to forge
a majority in parliament. Lacking a political culture
allowing minority governments to rule over the longer-
term, the president may appoint a caretaker
government and call early elections within six
months, which would overlap with Slovakia’s rotating
presidency in the EU Council. No Czech
governments since 2002 have served a full term, and
Slovakia is perhaps becoming more Czech in terms
of weak and unstable governments, even as the
current Czech government looks set to ﬁnish its full
term.
Implications
The election reﬂects Smer’s continued weakening on the back of a profound disillusionment with mainstream
politics. The ﬁrst big warning sign for Smer was Fico’s major defeat in the 2014 presidential run-oﬀ by Andrej Kiska,
a non-partisan political underdog. In search of solutions to address perceived incompetence and widespread
corruption – to a large extent nurtured by Smer during its eight years in power – a signiﬁcant part of the electorate is
desperate for quick ﬁxes to Slovakia’s deep-rooted problems. Indeed, the retreat of the liberal pretense in Slovakia,
just as in Hungary and Poland, has been primarily voter-driven.
Furthermore, as a result of the election, political discourse is no longer centred around the existence of a Smer and
an anti-Smer bloc, but now includes a new dimension on containing the extremists. Ignoring the representatives of
more than 200,000 voters who chose ĽSNS may fuel disillusionment not just with mainstream parties, but with the
overall democratic process. It is crucial that the moderate parties study what worked and what didn’t in other
European countries, for example in neighbouring Austria, whose far-right has traditionally had a much bigger
presence in parliament.
Overall, the election spells the dawn of a new political era. In the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, the dominant centre-right
faced weak opposition, and was able to push through radical reforms that created big winners and losers. Riding the
wave of reform fatigue while reaping the economic fruits of reform, Smer established its dominance, as the centre-
right imploded. After the most recent election, the whole political scene looks fundamentally fractured. Indeed, weak,
unstable or caretaker governments will hardly be able to decisively address the urgent concerns of the electorate,
heralding possible further strengthening of the fringes, or the re-emergence of a strong Smer in the wake of chaos.
While many questions still remain and the dust is yet to settle, one thing is clear: Slovakia has entered uncharted
waters.
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